










Anne Goes and Jerry R. Skees 
Anne Goes is a Research Associate at GlobalAgRisk, Inc., Lexington, KY.  Jerry R. Skees is H.B. Price Professor of 






 Paper prepared for presentation at the American Agricultural Economics Association Annual 














Copyright 2003 by Anne Goes and Jerry R. Skees.  The work presented here is taken from Anne Goes’ 
Master’s thesis for the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of Kentucky: 





Financing Natural Disaster Risk Using Charity Contributions  
and Ex Ante Index Insurance 
 
 
Anne Goes and Jerry R. Skees 
 
Abstract 
The scale of loss from natural disasters in low-income countries often exceeds the resources of 
internal and external sources of relief funding.  Catastrophe bonds offer the opportunity to 
transfer the risk of low-probability, high-loss events to the capital market where there is greater 
capacity to absorb disaster losses.  This paper details some problems inherent in traditional 
sources of disaster relief and proposes an alternative mechanism for catastrophe risk transfer that 
unites financial innovations and donor communities. 
 Introduction 
Natural disasters disproportionately affect low and middle income countries, which are 
limited in their capacity to absorb widespread damage brought about by catastrophic events.  
According to the World Bank, 94 percent of natural disasters between 1990 and 1998 and 97 
percent of deaths related to natural disasters occurred in developing countries (World Bank, 
2001).  The average cost of a natural disaster as a proportion of GDP is 20 percent greater for 
LMIC’s than for high-income countries (Freeman, 2000).   
In the wake of a natural disaster, low and middle income countries (LMIC’s) must divert 
funds from limited budgets, take on additional loans and/or accept international aid to provide 
humanitarian aid and reconstruction.  Though research on the long-term economic impact of 
natural disasters on LMIC’s is mixed, it is evident that natural disasters do negatively impact the 
poorest, marginalized sectors within an affected community. Frederick Cuny wrote, “A disaster 
makes it very evident that the poor are vulnerable because they are poor” (Cuny, 1983:54).  
Marginal groups may suffer extreme losses from a natural disaster while the economic impact 
may not be felt nationwide since these groups contribute only a small amount to GDP. The rest 
of the economy may experience positive growth post-disaster, while affected sub-groups remain 
marginalized and even excluded from the reconstruction efforts. 
 
Market Failure  
The insurance markets in most LMIC’s are underdeveloped. Risk exposure and weak 
infrastructure of many LMIC’s often limits the supply of insurance.  Likewise, lack of 
information and high poverty rates translate into very little demand for formal insurance 
mechanisms.  In these cases, informal insurance mechanisms provide limited hedging against certain independent risks.  However, informal insurance can be more costly and may become 
“insolvent” when a catastrophe affects an entire community (World Bank, 2000/2001). 
While insurance is designed to reduce the public burden of individual loss, it is less 
useful for managing the economic impact and correlated losses of a catastrophic event (Petak, 
1998).   Natural disasters cause highly correlated losses which are essentially uninsurable.  
Unlike independent events, such as fires or auto accidents, weather-related catastrophes typically 
affect a large proportion of people within a single area.  Risks from covariant or correlated 
events must be spread temporally rather than spatially, making it difficult for insurers to spread 
their risk exposure.   Consequently, highly correlated losses translate to a larger than expected 
number of insurance claims. In the aftermath of a catastrophic event, indemnity obligations can 
overwhelm insurance companies, threatening them with insolvency.   
Catastrophic risks fail to meet standard conditions of insurability.  The six conditions of 
insurability are: 1) there must be a large number of exposure units; 2) the loss must be accidental 
and unintentional; 3) the loss must be determinable and measurable; 4) the loss should not be 
catastrophic; 5) the chance of loss must be calculable; and 6) the premium must be economically 
feasible (Rejda, 1995:23).  Natural disasters violate the last three requirements.  Whereas risk 
pooling reduces risk exposure for independent events, it increases an insurer’s catastrophic risk 
exposure by insuring a large group that may suffer simultaneous losses from a natural disaster.  
Though catastrophic events may be infrequent, ambiguity surrounding the frequency and severity 
of natural disasters is high.  This uncertainty makes the pricing of catastrophe insurance difficult 
as losses are not independent nor are they completely correlated.  Risk loading is a common 
practice used to raise premium rates to account for the uncertainty of loss.  As a result, the people who are most vulnerable to natural disasters are the least able to afford risk mitigation and 
management. 
Yet even where catastrophe coverage is available, it has been observed that there is low 
demand for catastrophe insurance, even in high-income countries. Kunreuther (1979) examined 
the psychology behind peoples’ decision to purchase insurance—particularly the lack of 
coverage against cataclysmic events-- and found that most people are unwilling to pay for low 
probability events, even when the potential damage incurred can be great.  This behavior is used 
to rationalize government response.  Even when insurance coverage is mandate, as with the U.S. 
National Flood Insurance Acts (1973, 1994), the government still assumes responsibility for 
providing aid to those who declined to purchase insurance and suffered losses (Barnett, 1999). 
 While the affected governments bear the brunt of the costs of major catastrophes, the 
over-burdened budgets of LMIC’s will be highly inadequate to meet these needs following 
certain disasters. External disaster financing from bilateral and multilateral emergency aid 
provides an additional source of financial assistance.  However, limitations of international 
assistance prevent the most efficient provisioning of disaster relief.  Two major concerns 
regarding international aid are delay in the disbursement of funds and unreliable funding 
(Fowler, 1997; IFRC, 2001).   Money coming from international relief organizations must be 
raised; while bilateral aid must travel through the political pipeline where it is may be tied to 
conditions for its use. Reliance on damage assessments, fundraising, and administrative approval 
also creates delays in the disbursement of relief aid.  Additionally, this type of humanitarian 
response reinforces risk-taking behavior, meaning that more damages will result from subsequent 
disasters. 
 Charity Catastrophe Bonds 
Current applications of CAT bonds are limited to providing liquid capital for commercial 
uses (and high-yield bonds for investors). Catastrophe (“CAT”) bonds emerged in response to 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 as an instrument for reinsurance companies to hedge their own risk of 
insolvency resulting from catastrophic events. Reinsurance companies provide access to 
contingent capital for primary insurers when indemnities exceed a specific level.  Just as 
reinsurers serve to reduce the credit risk of the primary insurer, catastrophe bonds reduce the 
credit risk of the reinsurer by providing a source of back-up capital.  Primary providers of 
insurance can also use catastrophe bonds to reinsure some of their own exposure. 
Like reinsurance, CAT bonds are intended to hedge against the upper limits of 
catastrophic loss.  Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of losses for a covariant event. Variance 
from the mean is abnormal, making it difficult to insure against the “tail risk” due to the large 
losses associated with infrequent but catastrophic natural disasters.  A catastrophe bond segments 
out the tail risk to a third party.  For countries with developed insurance sectors, insurers and 
reinsurers can manage lower layers of loss, as indicated in Figure 1. 













 For poor countries that are vulnerable to large losses from natural disasters, small nations 
in particular, a charity catastrophe bond could provide additional capital for disaster relief 
efforts.  This source of contingent capital could be structured to encourage more efficient use of 
disaster relief funds through ex ante planning, access to unconditional capital, and objective 
means of allocation.   
Existing catastrophe bonds could be designed to provide a source of contingent capital 
for developing countries following a natural disaster.  This external funding would provide 
resources for disaster relief and recovery in such a way that could overcome some of the 
limitations of traditional sources of aid.  Furthermore, removing the catastrophe exposure in 
LMIC’s would open the door for the development of formal insurance sectors for managing 
more frequent, independent risks.   As these markets emerge, financing of catastrophe risk can be 
more fully internalized.   
A charity CAT bond would be structured similarly to existing commercial CAT bonds.  
The main difference is in the objective.  Similar to a reinsurance contract, a charity CAT bond 
would guarantee a pre-determined payment of money contingent upon the occurrence of a pre-
specified natural disaster.  In this situation, however, the financing would come from bond 
investors while the premiums would accumulate from charitable donations.  A charity CAT bond 
would leverage contributions to disaster relief by promoting more efficient use of disaster relief 
funds while generating returns that could increase the amount of available funds in the event of a 
natural disaster.  In the absence of a disaster, the investor would enjoy a good return on their 
investment. 
Recently, increased attention has been given to researching alternative applications for 
CAT bonds in developing countries.  Based on the difficulties LMIC’s have financing disaster management internally, Kunreuther and Linnerooth-Bayer (2002) make the case that CAT bonds 
could be incorporated as a risk-transfer mechanism for LMIC’s.  The authors suggest that a CAT 
bond, with subsidized premiums, could act as a substitute for a reinsurance contract to provide a 
source of contingent capital.   They support the use of risk transfer mechanisms for emerging 
economies rather than disaster risk financing instruments which can over-burden government 
resources.  
For countries with limited government resources, risk transfer (hedging) can have many 
advantages over ex post disaster financing in both the short and the long run by providing fast 
access to capital, and avoiding budgetary diversions and additional loans.  Another important 
advantage is that unlike free disaster assistance, hedging instruments can be designed to provide 
incentives for disaster planning and mitigation (Kunreuther and Linnerooth-Bayer, 2002; Skees, 
et al., 2002).  
Weather derivative contracts are one type of hedging instrument that has begun to emerge 
as a substitute for yield-based crop insurance. This type of insurance can be used to manage 
weather-related crop risks without providing incentives for poor management (Skees, et al., 
2002; Skees, 1999).  For example, indemnity payments are based on rainfall levels and can 
hedge against droughts or excessive rainfall.  A nearly identical structure can also be used to 
establish CAT bonds for more extreme, infrequent risks while individuals or communities can 
bear the cost of managing lower layers of risks. Skees, et al., discuss several alternative 
instruments for utilizing the wealth of capital markets to aid the rural poor.  They propose that 
index-based rainfall insurance could provide more efficient hedging than traditional forms of 
crop insurance. An indexed-based trigger allows for immediate access to capital in the event of a 
catastrophe, circumventing time delays and reducing transaction costs.  An indexed-based trigger 
also reduces opportunities for moral hazard, as the event measure can be independently verified 
and cannot be influenced by manipulation.   A parametric index can be based on wind speed, 
Richter scale measurements, or rainfall depending on the event to be measured.  Payment would 
be calculated from the index, and could account for both severity and proximity to populations 
(an indicator of impact).  A basic payment structure would determine the percentage payout 
based on the difference between the strike level (the trigger) and the recorded measure of the 
event, x, when x exceeds the strike value (Skees, 2001; Martin, et al., 2002).  
Percentage Payment = (x-strike)/strike   
 For example, an earthquake index could have a strike of a 7.0 Richter scale reading. An 
earthquake with a magnitude above this level would trigger bond payment.  The contract can be 
designed to scale payments incrementally for measures in excess of the strike to account for 
increased severity. A similar structure could be used to cover excess rainfall within a period of 
time or wind speed.  The use of an index for determining relief payments for natural disasters 
may be best suited for quickly-emerging disasters (floods, earthquakes, hurricanes), than for 
those that emerge slowly (i.e., drought), and therefore, have no point from which to measure the 
exact onset/duration of the event.  Nonetheless, certain thresholds of too little rain can be 
indexed and used to make payments when there are severe droughts. 
The tradeoff with using an index to reduce moral hazard is an increase in the basis risk. 
Index contracts depend upon a strong correlation between the event creating the index and the 
losses of the individual who is insured. Establishment of such an index would be useful for numerous applications.  The weather 
data required to create and make use of the index is a public good which has many beneficiaries.  
Weather information is valuable to the agricultural sector, civil engineering and city planning, 
etc. This information can also help support the development of weather derivative markets as 
substitute for insurance in LMIC’s for lower layers of risk (Skees, et al. 2002).  Creation of a 
weather index requires a risk evaluation to determine the appropriate trigger levels.  This 
assessment of exposure can identify a country’s vulnerabilities and aid in disaster planning and 
mitigation (Varangis, Skees, and Barnett, 2001). Because of the many benefits that can be 
derived from compiling this information, the World Bank or similar institutions should have a 
vested interest in supporting the infrastructure for weather stations, data analysis, etc. 
The framework required to develop a parametric weather index would also serve to 
support multiple instruments for managing weather risk at several layers: 1) individual insurance 
against weather events; 2) insurance sold to collective groups that could become mutual 
insurance providers; 3) private/government reinsurance; and 4) indexed securities for disaster 
assistance.  Skees, et al. emphasize the importance of effective financial markets to the growth 
and resilience of the rural sector.  Creation of charity catastrophe bonds would facilitate the 
transition towards accessible markets for risk management, savings and investment.  
The goal of a charity catastrophe bond is to provide an alternative source of disaster relief 
funds for infrequent, extreme events that are essentially uninsurable due to the widespread 
damage they cause.  Other market-based mechanisms could be encouraged for hedging against 
more frequent, less severe risks, as reliance on free aid for all but the most extreme natural 
disasters provides no incentive for individuals and communities to reduce their exposure to 
regularly occurring events.  Low-income countries are least able to absorb catastrophe risk and would benefit the most from a catastrophe bond that is pure charity.  Countries with higher per 
capita incomes would be able to bear a portion of the cost of this risk transfer, while high income 
countries can internalize a fully commercial product.  
Whereas the premiums paid to purchase reinsurance transfer the insurers’ catastrophe risk 
to a third party, the donated charity bond premiums would pay to transfer the catastrophe risk to 
the capital markets (Kunreuther and Linnerooth-Bayer, 2002).   The principal and interest would 
be held in escrow until occurrence of a triggering event, in which case the funds would then be 
disbursed as disaster relief.  In the absence of a triggering event, investors would regain their 
principal and accumulated interest upon the bond’s maturity.  Figure 2 illustrates the proposed 
structure of a charity CAT bond. 















Investors who have both a desire to diversify their portfolios and a philanthropic heart 
would purchase these bonds from a managing financial institution (e.g. an investment bank). 
Investors purchase the bonds and in the event of a natural disaster, all or most of their principal 
will go towards disaster relief.  Otherwise, they receive a premium above the guaranteed rate. The role of donors would be to contribute to the premium on the bonds, supplementing 
the contingent relief funds while simultaneously encouraging investment in CAT bonds.  From 
one aspect, donations to the charity bond funds are essentially an investment in the development 
of market-based securities for managing catastrophic risk.  Philanthropists who might typically 
donate to relief efforts after an event has occurred can leverage their money and good intentions 
via ex ante donations so that their money can be used more efficiently if needed. Donations to 
the charity bond would likely be tax-deductible.  One constraint concerning the use of donations 
to generate the bond premiums is that a substantial amount of donations would need to be 
secured in advance of investments so that a minimum rate of return could be identified. 
If bond payment were not triggered during the life of the bond, then investors would 
regain their principal plus accumulated interest.  The return on principal would be dependent 
upon the amount of charitable donations made to the fund.  It should also be possible for the 
holding company to invest the CAT bond funds into short-term liquid investments, such as T-
bills, that would provide a low, risk-free return in addition to the accumulated premiums.   
Were a natural catastrophe to occur, a parametric index would indicate the amount of 
payment to be disbursed by the managing institution.  A consortium of international relief 
organizations and local NGO’s could be established to receive the relief funds, which would then 
be used to aid the affected country.  The disbursement of funds would be pre-arranged so that 
payment would be immediately available following a catastrophic event. An impartial financial 
institution would manage the bond funds and disbursement, to significantly lower the risk of 
misuse of funds and credit risk. 
Incorporating CAT bonds into a relief system could overcome some of the problems 
associated with free disaster aid.  The decision to provide international disaster aid is most often made post hoc without any conditions or criteria for proper use and equitable distribution of 
resources.  Without ex ante planning, corruption and politics can negatively influence the flow of 
disaster aid (Skees, et al., 2002).  Transferring the risk to capital markets would theoretically 
relieve international aid organizations of some of their fundraising obligations, allowing more 
time and resources to be spent on their primary concern—disaster relief  (Freeman, et al., 2002).  
However, the cooperation (and endorsement) of international relief organizations and 
participating governments may be essential to the effectiveness of this concept.   
The advantage of CAT bonds over traditional reinsurance lies in lower transaction costs 
and the absence of default (credit) risk.  Nell and Richter suggest that, in theory, CAT bonds 
should be less expensive than purchasing reinsurance.  They conclude that the high premiums for 
reinsurance reflect the risk aversion of the reinsurer, as witnessed by higher premiums charged 
for higher levels of loss.  At the moment, however, premiums on CAT bonds are quite high, 
generating returns of 4-8% above LIBOR
1.   
Bantwal and Kunreuther (1999) examined the reasons behind high premiums on CAT 
bonds.  They determined that in terms of Sharpe ratios
2 CAT bonds are more favorable than 
bonds of comparable risk.  In fact, they suggest that an investor would be highly risk averse to 
not invest in CAT bonds.  However, the justification for high rates for catastrophe reinsurance 
equally justifies the high yields on catastrophe bonds.  The uncertainty surrounding the 
probability and magnitude of loss creates a demand for large returns on bond investments.  
Bantwal and Kunreuther also point to myopic loss aversion on behalf of investors as a factor 
restricting market size.  The notion of sudden and total loss of principal, even at very low odds 
                                                 
1 The London InterBank Offered Rate, the lending rate between banks, is a common benchmark for short-term 
interest rates. As of September 3, 2002 the 12 month rate was USD 1.89, down from 3.56 in August 
2 Sharpe ratio=return over the risk-free rate/standard deviation of returns  
 may limit investor interest in catastrophe-linked securities.  Additionally, the cost of education to 
investors for researching and understanding new catastrophe-linked securities may be large.  
Standardization of these products over time should help reduce this constraint. 
Technological improvements have allowed researchers to develop improved weather models 
which can help to assess the risk exposure of specific locations regarding specific natural events.  
It is expected that as disaster loss models become more accurate and as CAT bonds show good 
performance over time, premium rates will decline and demand for these products will grow.  
Development of new bond structures that limit risk exposure, such as pooled global CAT risks, 
will also further the market interest in these instruments. 
 
Methodology & Results 
A Monte Carlo simulation was used to illustrate the structure of  charity catastrophe bond 
representing a portfolio of potential events.  Random numbers between 0 and 1 were generated in 
a matrix representing 1000 possible outcomes for independent geographic regions for a single 
year.  A value less than or equal to 0.01 signaled occurrence of a 1-in-a-100-year event, 
triggering a payment of 100% of principal.   Using the previous formula, the expected return is 
calculated to be 7.9%. 
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This matrix is designed to show the benefits of creating a portfolio of geographic regions 
covered by the charity bond.  The variance was estimated based the outcomes of all 1000 draws  
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With coverage of only a single region, the variance is 3.85% with an expected return of 
7.9% based on a 10% premium.  Figure 5 illustrates how variance on returns decreases as regions 
are added.  Dramatic reductions in the variance can be achieved by pooling only a few regions.  
Additionally, as more regions are added to the portfolio, the likelihood of total loss of principal 
declines.  With a single event, the probability of total loss of capital equals the probability of a 
catastrophic event, 0.01 in our example.  When countries are pooled in a bond portfolio, the 
maximum payment per country is only a portion of the principal, P/n, where n is equal to the 
number of regions included in the portfolio.  Given that the disaster events across countries are 
assumed to be independent, the likelihood that all included regions will experience a catastrophic 
event in the same year is the product of their individual disaster probabilities:   
p total loss =  (p1) *  (p2) *  (p3)…*  (pn) 
Assuming our portfolio covers 1-in-a-100-year independent events in 5 countries the probability 
of total investor loss equals one in a billion: 
  p total loss =  (0.01)
 5 = 0.0000000001 
As the graph shows, after the addition of six or seven region-events, little more reduction 
in variance is realized.  This is an important distinction as the benefits of pooling regions are 
shown under the assumption that the catastrophes are independent across these countries/regions; 
there is zero correlation between the occurrence of natural disasters in one area and another.  
Therefore, reducing investor catastrophe exposure would require identifying only a small group 
of countries possessing independent catastrophe exposures.  The transaction costs of pooling 
countries into “bundled” catastrophe bond could be quite high.  Still, the transaction costs would 
rise with each additional country, but there may be some economies of scale and the marginal cost of adding each additional country should decline.  Likewise, with a smaller pool, risk 
exposure increases.  Therefore, it is encouraging that grouping even a small number of countries 
greatly reduces investor risk exposure.  The optimal portfolio could be determined by the 
intersection of the transaction costs (indicated by the dashed line in Figure 3) and the variance.   
It may even be possible to create a portfolio of countries that experience negative 
correlation between certain events.  For example, in El Niño years the likelihood of abnormally 
high rainfall in the eastern Pacific increases with the expectation of reduced rainfall in Indonesia 
and Malaysia (NOAA Climate Prediction Center). 
 























  The bond could also be structured to provide regular coupon payments to the investor, 
however, rolling over the interest and principal into consecutive years allows for leveraging of 
the initial investment and generates growth of potential relief payments.  The main objective of 
implementing a market-based instrument for catastrophe financing is to provide an alternative and reliable source of emergency capital that can be provided in an efficient and equitable 
manner.  Therefore, the role of the CAT bond as an investment tool is secondary.  
 
Summary & Conclusions 
A charity CAT bond eliminates or reduces the premium for catastrophe coverage for low-
income countries, yet requires ex ante measures for disaster coping in coordinated effort with 
government agencies and aid organizations.  Potential long-run benefits of supplying disaster aid 
in this form include improved disaster preparedness, cooperation between aid organizations, and 
emergence of domestic insurance and other financial markets. 
More immediate benefits can be realized through more efficient use of disaster relief 
funds. The proposed charity CAT bond could be structured in a way to address the limitations of 
traditional aid, allowing for objective, reliable and accessible emergency capital.  Access to 
capital is often more effective than the provisioning of material items as it allows funds to be 
spent locally, encouraging local disaster management capacity and supporting the local/regional 
economy (IFRC, 2001; Smillie, 2001).  Monetary resources also ensure that only needed supplies 
will be purchased, eliminating the burden often placed on disaster-stricken communities by the 
flood of unnecessary items. 
Additionally, the supplemental aid provided by a charity CAT bond could prevent 
budgetary diversions by the government and multilateral development institutions.  By 
smoothing the economic impact of natural disasters, affected countries can recover more quickly 
without experiencing severe economic shocks.  The payment trigger can be tied to a severity 
index for objective and immediate determination.  The liquidity and flexibility of these funds would enable relief organizations to quickly obtain supplies from local/regional sources in direct 
response to victims needs.   
Even though CAT bonds hedge against very low-probability events, pooling these risks 
globally would further reduce expected loss, increasing investor appeal.   A pooled CAT bond 
would also expand the capital reserve available for disaster relief.  CAT bonds which are tied to a 
parametric index can eliminate moral hazard and time delays in acquiring relief funding.  
Furthermore, when established in conjunction with ex ante rules of distribution, opportunities for 
misallocation of funds are reduced. 
  Transferring the risk of catastrophic natural disasters prevents undue economic shocks to 
the fragile economies of low-income countries.  This in turn can facilitate the development of 
formal risk management mechanisms, including insurance and mitigation measures.  Reliable 
financial markets can provide opportunities for income generation and economic development 
with increased access to financial markets.  
However, long-run solutions to disaster risk management are constrained by the abilities 
of the central government to provide regulations, legal frameworks and other services.  Poorly 
defined property rights also will limit investments made in risk mitigation.  Until the underlying 
problems of poverty and social inequality are addressed, marginalized sectors of society will 
remain vulnerable to the economic impact of natural disasters. 
  There are several other foreseeable constraints to the implementation of a charity 
catastrophe bond.  First, investor interest in commercial CAT bonds remains relatively low.  It 
may be some time before investors and donors feel comfortable with the new concepts contained 
in a charity CAT bond.  In addition to the newness of the concept, there is uncertainty regarding 
donors’ willingness to give before a disaster strikes. Without expressed interest in this concept, the initial costs for research and development may be perceived as prohibitive.  Development 
Banks have a role to play in lowering these initial costs.  
Once structured, however, the political economy could distort the effectiveness of the 
bond.  Competition for credit between relief organizations can interfere with cooperation 
between different donors and relief organizations.  Obviously, creating a consortium of aid 
organizations cannot be achieved without cooperation and coordination at all levels.  
Nevertheless, the structure of a charity catastrophe bond could make risks more explicit  by 
pricing the risk.  When information on risk exposure is identified, better decisions can then be 
made regarding risk managementREFERENCES 
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